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For approximately seven years, John Moore underwent diagnosis,
treatment, and care for "hairy cell leukemia." In the course of treat-
ment, doctors at UCLA Medical Center drew Moore's blood, blood
components, by-products, and genetic material, and removed bodily
tissues and spleen. Although the primary purpose of this medical
care was to cure his cancer, the doctors received his consent to use
his blood and bodily substances in research unrelated to treating
Moore's illness. Dr. David Golde and Shirley Quan, a technician
and inventor, eventually used Moore's unique cells as the basis for
the development of the "Mo-cell Line,"' which they patented and
sold to biotechnology companies for considerable profit.2 Dr.
Golde has stated that "to our knowledge, this is the only human cell-
line that produces these factors." '3
Moore brought suit against Golde and Quan, the Regents of the
University of California, the UCLA Medical Center, and a host of
genetic, biomedical, and bioengineering firms, some known and
some yet unknown to the plaintiff.4 He claims that had he known
1. A number of biologically valuable substances have been produced from the Mo-
cell line. Among these are lymphokines, which are useful in the treatment of blood
diseases, cancers, and immune system deficiencies, as well as other blood factors that are
used in the development and proliferation of specialized blood cells. Appellant's Open-
ing Brief at 5, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, App. No. B021195 (Cal.
Ct. App., Aug. 1987) [hereinafter Brief].
2. Dr. Golde and the University of California Board of Regents sold exclusive access
to Moore's cells and research being performed on them to Genetics Institute for a total
of $330,000, payable over a three-year period. Golde became a consultant to Genetics
Institute in exchange for options on 75,000 shares of the company's stock at one cent
per share. Another biotechnology company, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation, paid
$110,000 to Golde and the Regents to share in the exclusive access to Moore's cells for
use in clinical testing and marketing. Id. at 12-13.
3. Id. at5.
4. The case is pending in the California Court of Appeal. The first cause of action in
the original complaint reads:
In addition to providing research material for countless scientific articles, plaintiff's
blood and bodily substances were also utilized to develop and obtain a patent enti-
tled 'Unique T-Lymphocyte Line and Products Derived Therefrom', commonly des-
ignated as the "Mo-Cell Line" and bearing United States patent number 4,438,032
... granted to David W. Golde, M.D. and Shirley G. Quan on March 20, 1984 and
concurrently assigned to the Regents of the University of California, and was also
sold, transferred, assigned, licensed, leased and otherwise made available to the
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that his body was being used for economic profit he would have
sought compensation, and that therefore he is entitled to the full
value of his contribution. 5 The defendants counter that Moore's
consent to the research was adequate to permit the development of
the cell line, and that in any event the fact that Moore donated the
cells is irrelevant to the question of ownership rights in the cell line,
since ownership rights hinge on who owns the patent rather than
who contributed the cells. 6 The case is still in litigation.
Issues raised by Moore's case are likely to reappear in the near
future. According to a Commerce Department forecast, the market
for genetically engineered products will amount to tens of billions
of dollars by the 1990s. 7 'Such growth will certainly be accompanied
by a growing number of claims by patients asserting a right to share
in the profits gained from research and development using their
cells. Several claims similar to Moore's have already been brought
but have been settled out of court. 8
Biogenetic Defendants and the other remaining defendants, and each of them, for
substantial' economic and commercial value.
Plaintiff's Complaint at 9, Moore v. Regents of University of California, No. 0513755,
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, 1984) reprinted in 3 Biotechnology L. Rep. 242,
243 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Complaint]. Although Moore does not raise many of the
claims addressed in this Current Topic, his case serves as a starting point for a discus-
sion of the issues that are likely to arise in similar contexts.
5. Brief, supra note 1, at 15, 17-18. Moore also claims that as a direct and proximate
result of the defendants' conduct, he has sustained economic loss and incurred expenses
and elements of special damages and has suffered mental and emotional distress and will
continue to suffer such distress in the future. Complaint, supra note 4, at 15. He also
seeks declaratory relief to the respective right, title, duties and obligations of each of the
parties to the action. Prayer for Relief at (b) in id..
6. Culliton, MoCell Case Has Its First Court Hearing, 226 Science 813 (1984).
7. Dolnick, Spare Parts, 195 The New Republic 16 (1986). "Industry analysts expect
that the products now in litigation will, by the mid-1990s, be part of a market serving
millions of patients and worth tens of billions of dollars." N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1987, § I
at 1, col. 6.
8. Dolnick, supra note 7, at 16. One example of such a claim arose in 1982 when
doctors at the University of California, San Diego, produced a human monoclonal an-
tibody from the lymph cells of the mother of a post-doctoral student, Dr. Hideaki
Hagiwara. The antibody was designed to attack the mother's cervical cancer. The
Hagiwara family claimed co-ownership rights to the cell-line that was developed. A set-
tlement between the two sides was eventually reached. The patent was assigned to the
University of California, and the Hagiwara Institute of Health in Japan received exclu-
sive license for the use of the cell-line in Asia, paying the University royalties on any
commercial product sales resulting from its use. Royston, Cell Lines From Human Pa-
tients: Who Owns Them?, 33 Clinical Res. 442, 442-43 (October 1985).
Several companies are working to develop the new method of producing monoclonal
antibodies for treating cancer patients. To create a monoclonal antibody, scientists in-
ject a cell from a patient's cancer into a laboratory mouse that produces specific antibo-
dies against the cancer. The antibodies are then taken from the mouse's spleen and
injected into the cancer patient. The antibody is also fused with a cancer cell to form a
"hybridoma" that can live in the lab and produce antibodies to act against a specific
cancer cell. See Henig, In Business to Treat Cancer, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 23,
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If such claims are allowed to succeed, research in this area may
slow significantly. The mere prospect of litigation may burden re-
search, and financial incentives for hospitals and researchers will de-
crease even more if the plaintiffs are successful. In addition to the
cost of litigation and/or settlement, the time and energy spent on
these cases will drain resources that might otherwise be spent in re-
search.' It is therefore crucial to formulate a coherent legal re-
sponse that will not unduly burden this beneficial research.
This Current Topic examines the strength of plaintiffs' claims to
share in profits from the sale of products derived from their cells.' 0
Existing informed consent doctrine, statutory and constitutional
rights to privacy, property law, and patent law provide principles on
which these patients can make creative yet powerful claims. Bio-
technology, however, raises many new and difficult questions that
our legal system has yet to answer specifically. Analysis of the issues
in this field is, therefore, limited to imperfect analogies.
The concerns raised by cell and biogenetic research can be di-
vided roughly into two questions. First, does a patient have a right
to exercise control over future use of his or her body in research
through the mechanism of specific consent? Second, if a patient
does consent to be used as a product base, ought he or she to be
compensated?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to explore a number of
interrelated issues. The question of consent involves: (1) profes-
sional medical standards; (2) common law and constitutional privacy
interests; (3) moral and philosophical views of the human body; and
1986,.at 82; Henig, A New Treatment, in id. The process of cloning is slow and imper-
fect. Doctors hope eventually to have a large enough library of hybridomas available so
that patients will not have to be the source of their own tumor-specific antibodies. The
related question that may arise is whether the original donor of the cell from which the
hybridoma was made will have a claim to any of the profits made by the doctors through
use of the antibody in the treatment of future cancer patients.
9. This sentiment was expressed in the context of the Hagiwara case by I. Royston,
who developed the monoclonal antibody in that case. Royston flagged the need for
"new laws which delineate the rights, if any, of patients to commercial products of cell
lines derived from their tissues ...If the patient does not wish to waive his rights I
would have to ask the University to negotiate an agreement with him so that my time will
not be taken up in subsequent litigation." See Royston, supra note 8, at 443.
10. It is possible to limit the discussion of patients' claims to royalties to this particu-
lar area of research. It may be that any patient whose case has helped to advance medi-
cal knowledge either directly or indirectly could make some claim to the researcher's
grant money, salary, or any other monetary gain linked to that knowledge. Administra-
tion of such a system would be nearly impossible and would cripple medical research
because of the sheer volume of claims. What differentiates Moore's claim is the exist-
ence of the patented cell-line in which an actual body substance has provided the basis
for the product. It is the royalties from the patent, not the unquantifiable gain in medi-
cal understanding or advance in technology, that Moore seeks to share.
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(4) property-based interests in the body. In turn, positing property-
based interests in the body helps to answer the question of compen-
sation. Patent law principles also suggest that a donor should be
fairly compensated for his or her unique contribution to the valua-
ble end product. Finally, patent law demonstrates that the most eq-
uitable legal solution to the problem is a licensing system between
the patient and the doctor that establishes a fixed rate of profit-
sharing.
I. The Patient's Specific Consent to Commercial
Use of His or Her Body
The first question to explore is whether doctors violate a patient's
right to control the disposition of his or her cells by using that pa-
tient's cells, without specific consent, to develop a marketable prod-
uct. Four general arguments support a patient's right to retain
control over his or her body parts. First, professional medical stan-
dards suggest that patients be fully and adequately informed of the
nature of scientific research in which they participate. Second, com-
mon law and statutory rights of privacy suggest that patients should
be protected from intrusion by researchers who would exploit their
cells. Third, the constitutional right of privacy recognizes zones of
personal activity into which the state cannot intrude without justifi-
cation. Finally, and most generally, moral and philosophical argu-
ments reject nonconsensual use of the human body.
A. Professional Medical Standards
It is axiomatic that patients must consent to their own medical
treatment. It Here, however, the question is not whether one must
consent to undergo certain treatment, but whether one must con-
sent to the particular use of one's cells, i.e., incorporation of them
into a valuable product. Moore claims that he was not fully in-
formed of the researchers' intention to profit from his cells. He al-
leges that he agreed to "certain written and non-written forms of
limited consent to the actual physical removal of his blood and bod-
!1. In its present form, the informed consent doctrine requires physicians to dis-
close adequately the nature of the proposed treatment according to prevailing standards
of medical practice. This standard isjudged in some jurisdictions by customary practice
in the area, in others by what the reasonable physician would disclose, and in others by
what the reasonable patient would need to know to make an intelligent choice. Cotton
& Sandier, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and Transplantation in ihe United
States, 7J. Legal Med. 55, 73-4 (1986). For a general discussion of the issues surround-





ilv substances for medical purposes, but none of these constituted
either an explicit or implicit authorization of consent to commercial
exploitation of his bodily substances."' 2 The defendants counter
that Moore did consent to their use of his cells in research and that
the further use of them to develop a saleable product did not re-
quire another specific consent agreement.' 3
A variety of professional codes and government regulations pre-
scribe the conduct of doctors in relation to their patients. Primary
among these is the Hippocratic Oath, a general set of guidelines for
doctors that prohibits them from acting contrary to their patients'
interests: "In every house where I come I will enter only for the
good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing
and seduction."' 4 In Moore's case, although the professional re-
sponsibility issue suggested by the Hippocratic Oath was not raised,
the doctors could argue that while they are prevented from hurting,
manipulating, or coercing the patient in order to benefit themselves,
such conduct was not present here. On the contrary, they could ar-
gue, Moore was treated successfully and had given his consent to
their research. However, Moore did not consent to the doctors'
commercial use of his body; in fact, he knew nothing about it. In
that sense, Moore could argue that he was "seduced" by the defend-
ants to their benefit in a way arguably violative of professional
standards.
The World Medical Assembly's Declaration of Helsinki, updated
in 1983, specifically addresses non-therapeutic biomedical research
using human subjects. The relevant section states:
The rights of the research subject to safeguard his or her integrity
must always be respected.... In any research on human beings, each
potential subject must be adequately informed of the aims, methods,
anticipated benefits and potential hazards of the study and the discom-
fort it may entail. He or she should be informed that he or she is at the
liberty to abstain from participation in the study and that he or she is
free to withdraw his or her consent to participation at any time. The
physician should then obtain the subject's freely-given informed con-
sent, preferably in writing. 15
12. Brief. supra note 1, at 27. Moore also argues that, "[blecause the Defendants
misrepresented and actively concealed from Plaintiff the value of his unique cells and
their commercial activities and patents based upon the cells, Plaintiff could not possibly
have given any form of implied or express informed consent to those activities." Id. at
14.
13. Culliton, supra note 6, at 813.
14. Reprinted in J. Areen, P. King, S. Goldberg & A. Capron, Law, Science, &
Medicine 273 (1984).
15. Id. at 928.
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The American Medical Association (AMA) has adopted similar
guidelines.'t 6 In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has promulgated regulations for the "Protection of
Human Subjects" that are binding on all research conducted or
funded in whole or in part by that department.' 7 According to the
various HHS regulations, "If the researcher wishes to remove
human material primarily to serve research interest ... full informed
consent is required ethically as well as by the regulations of HHS
and The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)."' 8 Among ele-
ments of informed consent defined in federal regulations are "an
explanation of the purposes of the research . . ." and "[a] descrip-
tion of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably
be expected from the research."' 9
Moore's argument is that under these guidelines he was himself
the subject of research and, therefore, deserved to be informed of
the researchers' purpose and anticipated benefits. 20 The research-
ers' aim was to produce a cell line, and they anticipated that it would
be patentable and thus profitable. These particular aims and the
anticipated benefits to the researchers were not communicated to
Moore in a manner consistent with the above-mentioned codes and
guidelines.
It is doubtful that Moore can prevail simply on grounds of
breached medical standards. He was not the "subject" of research
in a strictly traditional sense, but rather the donor of cells that were
themselves the research subject. Moreover, the doctors did elicit his
consent for the use of his cells in general research, and it is possible
that such consent may be interpreted under these guidelines as a
relinquishment of all rights to control the use of those cells.
Professional ethics are helpful in establishing a principle of re-
spect for the patient's dignity and autonomy. Nonetheless, because
it is likely that Moore's case will fail under traditional informed con-
sent doctrine, it is necessary to go beyond that inquiry to a discus-
sion of other theories on which a patient's claim to retain control
over his or her body may be based.
16. Id. at 929-30.
17. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1983).
18. Levine, Research That Could Yield Marketable Products From Human Materials:
The Problem Of Informed Consent, 1 IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research 6
Jan,/Feb. 1986 [hereinafter IRB1.
19. Id.




B. Common Law and Statutory Rights of Privacy
Even if professional standards do not require a doctor to seek
specific consent to use a patient's cells as the basis of a marketable
product, common law and statutory rights of privacy may safeguard
the patient's right to control the disposition of his or her body parts.
The doctors' use of Moore's cells without his specific consent argua-
bly intrudes on his personal life in a manner violative of his right of
privacy as it is recognized at common law and embodied in many
state statutes.
In a seminal 1890 article entitled "The Right to Privacy," 2 ' Sa-
muel Warren and Louis Brandeis reviewed past cases that had pro-
tected a right to privacy without expressly referring to it as such,
and concluded that underlying these cases was a broader principle,
separate from property or contract law, that deserved independant
recognition. The authors found that:
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of
sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to
men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in phys-
ical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal
recognition.
22
The right of privacy makes cognizable the individual's right to "de-
cide whether that which is his shall be given to the public." 2 3 Re-
gardless of their inherent value, certain things are protected from
exposure or exploitation merely because exposure would disturb a
person's peace of mind. In other words, the right of privacy recog-
nizes a person's right "to be let alone."
24
The common law conception of a right of privacy developed out
of this need for protection of the individual's feelings. 2 5 According
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the general principles of this
21. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id. at 199.
24. Justice Brandeis made one of the most famous statements of the right to privacy
in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928): "The
makers of our constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensation. 'They conferred, as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Although Brandeis cast the privacy right in constitutional
terms, the right to be let alone echoes a right he found existing at common law. For an
articulation of the common law right to privacy, see, e.g., Timperley v. Chase Collection
Service, 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 699, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).: "The right to privacy has
been defined as the right to live one's life in seclusion, without being subjected to un-
warranted and undesired publicity; in short, it is the right to be let alone."
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 1986).
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common law right of privacy provide that privacy is invaded by "un-
reasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, or
unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life . . ,"2
Although related to libel, a privacy claim need not allege injury to
character or reputation, but only mental distress. The motivations
of the defendant have been held to be unimportant in determining
whether there is a cause of action. 27 The right of privacy may be
waived through consent. 28 However, "consent may be asserted as a
defense only where the consent has not been exceeded; consent
which has been exceeded is not a defense." 29
Invasion of the right of privacy usually involves the nonconsen-
sual use of photographs, wiretaps, and the like. "The advance of
civilization" to which Warren and Brandeis alluded, however, un-
doubtedly also includes scientific advancement that has the poten-
tial to cause hurt feelings. In this light, it would seem quite
reasonable for Moore to claim that the doctors violated his right to
be let alone. In asserting such a claim, all he would need to show is
that something he considers personal, in this case his cells, has been
invaded by another in excess of his specific consent. Because
Moore's consent was exceeded, he has a strong claim for damages
under this right of privacy doctrine.30 Moore's hurt may stem also
from the fact that his body was commoditized. Not*only did the doc-
tors act without Moore's specific consent, but also they made com-
mercial use of his cells-an end that not only goes beyond his
consent, but offends his personal integrity.
3'
C. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The constitutional right of privacy protects certain activities-
"zones of privacy"-from state interference.32 Within these zones a
26. Restatement (Second) Torts § 652A (1977).
27. Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1985).
28. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
29. 62 Am. Jur. 2d Privacy § 19 (1972), citing Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119
Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1972). See supra note II and accompanying text.
30. The hurt feelings aspect of Moore's case is present in his claim that he "has
suffered mental and emotional distress and will continue to suffer in the future." Com-
plaint, supra note 4, at 15.
31. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
32. The first reference to a right to privacy was made by the Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance." The present discussion of privacy issues is not intended to be exhaustive,





person may act free from unwarranted intrusion by the govern-
ment. : Because this privacy right protects the individual from state
action, constitutional claims may only be asserted against a govern-
ment agency or a governmentally funded or subsidized agency.1
4
Although Moore does not make constitutional arguments, such
claims could be raised against the University of California Board of
Regents, a state governmental entity. 35 Even where the defendant is
not a government or governmentally funded entity, however, the
constitutional issues are useful in informing the choice of policy.
The same values that are cherished and protected from the state by
the Constitution deserve respect in all spheres, not only when the
government is an actor.
Before the constitutional right of privacy was judicially recog-
nized, several courts upheld a "right" to be free from unwanted in-
trusion-a right they cast in terms of personal autonomy. In the
context of medical care, Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote for the New
York Court of Appeals, "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
body."-16 This notion of human autonomy is closely bound to the
privacy right. As enunciated by the New York Supreme Court in an
opinion upholding a patient's right to reject life-sustaining treat-
ment, "IT]he essence of this [privacy] right is autonomy over mat-
ters of personal integrity, including control over one's body .... "37
With Grisuold v. Connecticut in 1965,38 the Supreme Court began to
etch out certain areas of activity that fall within the protected zone
of privacy where state regulation is constitutionally impermissible
33. The Court has applied "strict scrutiny" to laws that interfere with "'fundamental
rights" guaranteed by the Constitution. This test requires that the state show a "com-
pelling interest" in passing laws that limit personal liberties. See, e.g., L. Tribe. American
Constitutional Law § 16-6, at 1000 (1978). The Supreme Court has held that the right
of privacy is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and one that requires a
showing of compelling state interest when it is limited by legislation. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
34. The constitutional claim against the state is particularly relevant in a case such as
Moore's, where one of the defendants, the Board of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia, is a governmental entity that receives government funding. However, even where
the defendant is not a government or governmentally funded entity, the constitutional
claims bear on the overall discussion of these issues.
35. See Brief, supra note I, at 44, 45 for a discussion of the applicability of federal
regulations to the defendants in this case.
36. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (finding that although removal of tumor without consent constituted trespass,
charitable hospital was not liable), rev'd on other gounds, 2 N.Y.2d 665 (1957).
37. Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S. 2d 517, 538, 73 A.2d 431 (1980). modified sub nora,
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 263, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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unless the state can demonstrate a compelling interest in the regula-
tion." Although the Supreme Court has not extended the privacy
right to encompass medical decisions, 40 the abortion decisions tend
to pave the way toward this recognition. Justice William Douglas
recognized the privacy protection of medical decisions in his con-
curring opinion in Doe v. Bolton,4 1 a companion case to Roe v. Wade,
when he wrote that the right of privacy includes "the freedom to
care for one's health and person." 42 The right of privacy has been
invoked by lower courts in certain medical contexts. One example
is in Andrews v. Ballard,43 where the Texas district court recognized
that the constitutional right of privacy protected an individual's de-
cision to obtain or reject medical treatment.
Even more relevant to Moore's claim, the right of privacy has jus-
tified a right to refuse medical treatment, as when terminally ill pa-
tients refuse life-sustaining treatment.44 Moore's right to refuse to
be the source of a profitable medical product may be protected by
these same constitutional considerations. If a patient has the right
to refuse medical treatment, even when such a refusal may damage
his or her health, then a patient should have a claim, at least equally
as strong, to refuse to be involved in medical procedures beyond
those to which he or she consented when that refusal will not cause
harm.
Although the right of privacy has protected individual choice in
certain medical areas, the Supreme Court has not defined precisely
the contours of this right. 45 What is clear is that the Constitution
protects the individual's right to procreate and the right to termi-
nate pregnancy, the right to choose certain medical treatment, and
39. A partial list of such activities includes the right to procreate, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the right to obtain an abortion in the first trimester, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. But see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) where the Court held in a fourth
amendment context that compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evi-
dence "implicates an expectation of privacy and security of such magnitude that the
intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Id. at
759.
41. 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973).
42. 410 U.S. at 213.
43. 498 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (upholding patient's right to undergo
acupuncture).
44. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 73 A.2d 431
(1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 431 (1977).
45. "The outer limits of ... privacy have not been marked by the Court." Carey v.




the right to refuse medical care. The right to control the use of
one's body parts and to prevent nonconsensual use of them is con-
sistent with these other constitutionally protected spheres and
should be included within the right of privacy.
However, the right of privacy is not absolute and is limited by
assertions of compelling state interest. The state has successfully
justified its interference with an individual's medical decision by as-
serting that it is protecting that person's life;4 6 protecting innocent
third parties, either particular individuals 47 or members of the soci-
ety at large; 48 or maintaining the ethical integrity ;f the medical pro-
fession.49 None of these limitations, however, seems applicable to
Moore's case.
In the cell research context, the state cannot assert that its inter-
ference with the patient's personal autonomy is protecting the pa-
tient's life; the patient's life was a factor only during the curative
stage of treatment, not during the subsequent research stage. Nor
is there the interest in protecting an innocent third party, which
generally applies to family members of a patient whose refusal of
treatment may result in death. 50 Finally, the concern for the integ-
rity of the medical profession, usually asserted in efforts to continue
life-sustaining treatment against the patient's will, may cut in favor
of the plaintiff's claim that he continue to consent to whatever use is
made of his body. As discussed above, professional ethics support a
system of full disclosure of the researchers' aims and expectations to
the patient. Assuming that Moore has a right to determine what
medical procedures he will undergo-a right protected by the con-
stitutional right of privacy-the state cannot assert a valid interest in
overriding that right.
46. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979); People v. Privetera, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 591 P.2d 919 (1979) (not permitting access to laetrile a legitimate state
interest).
47. See, e.g., In re Application of Jamaica Hospital, 128 Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d
898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (blood transfusion compelled where life of unborn fetus at
stake); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (prohibiting abortion of viable fetus).
48. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (smallpox vaccination).
49. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 583, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971) ("When the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts and their interests are
pitted against the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to resolve the problem by
permitting the hospital and its staff to pursue their function [of preserving life] accord-
ing to their professional standards").
50. Arguably a state could assert an interest in protecting a third party where the
cell-based product was essential for curing a particular disease.
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D. JIoral and Philosophical Arguments
Finally, in exploring the scope of the patient's control, it is neces-
sary to turn to a broader discussion of whether it matters morally or
philosophically that Moore was not fully informed, or that he did
not fully consent to be the basis for the Mo-cell line. A conception
of human dignity lies at the heart of the assertion that the patient
has a right to control the disposition of his body parts. Research
with human cells that results in significant economic gain for the
researcher and no'gain for the patient offends the traditional mores
of our society in a manner impossible to quantify. Such research
tends to treat the human body as a commodity-a means to a profit-
able end. 5' The dignity and sanctity with which we regard the
human whole, body as well as mind and soul, are absent when we
allow researchers to further their own interests without the patient's
participation by using a patient's cells as the basis for a marketable
product. Doctors, like Moore's, who do not get the patient's specific
consent yet proceed with their development of a commercial prod-
uct derived from their patients' bodies are acting contrary to our
concept of respect for the human body.
This same concept of human dignity and autonomy is at the heart
of medical ethics. 52 One ethicist, John Fletcher, writes of the auton-
omy issue in medicine:
To be a person, to have moral being, is to have the capacity for intelli-
gent causal action .... In Biblical terms it means that man is made in
the image of God, and that therefore he is self-conscious, saying 'I
am,' and that he is self-determined, saying 'I will'. This is what it
means to be a person and not an object to be manipulated either by
doctors or medicine or by the impassive operations of physical
nature. 5
3
Fletcher's discussion focuses on the notion of self-determination.
For Fletcher, the very definition of personhood includes the ability
to be responsible for one's actions. While this passage addresses
the entire informed consent question, it also applies to the specific
question of the nonconsensual use of a cell in a marketable product.
When a person like Moore unknowingly becomes the basis for a
51. Kant's first maxim seems to reject such treatment: "Act so as to treat humanity,
whether in thine own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as a
means only." I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 96 (1964).
52. See, e.g., P. Ramsey, The Patient as Person (1970). Ramsey's thesis is that respect
for individual human autonomy ought to be central in determining medical priorities
and ought to limit the scope of medical procedures in many instances.




commercial product, he may feel that he has lost some of that self-
determination that makes him human.
Thomas Murray, a professor of ethics, has discussed the ethical
issues present in Moore's particular case. Murray is interested in
how we view human body tissues after they have been removed from
the body.
There is something very special about human organs and tissues, even
when removed from the body. We do retain moral interests in them,
so that at least they are not misused or treated in an undignified man-
ner .... We do not let people sell them, nor do we let others profit
unduly from them.
54
This view that the sanctity of the human body lingers even after re-
moval is essential to the discussion of patients' rights here. All legal
arguments are dwarfed if we accept the overarching notion that a
human's body deserves respect and that using it without the owner's
consent to make a commercial product violates that respect.
These moral intuitions are the core of the argument requiring
that patients give specific consent to the use of their body parts in
marketable products. Only when the patient is informed fully and
consents freely to the use of his or her body can the resulting re-
search be consistent with the notion of human self-determination.
A patient's consent at one stage to donate parts of his or her body to
research does not imply his or her consent to be used as the basis
for a saleable product. Informed consent is necessary for every as-
pect of the research that uses a person's body.
II. The Patient's Claim for Compensation
The above discussion suggests that a patient must give specific
consent to be used by researchers for commercial purposes. In the
absence of such consent, the patient may make a claim against the
researchers that stems from notions of professional ethics, the right
of privacy, and moral intuitions. While such an argument would
sustain a claim for emotional damages, the claim for compensation
becomes even more compelling when it is based not only on the lack
of consent, but also on an argument that the researchers have vio-
lated the patient's property rights. 55 The first step toward this as-
54. Murray, Who Owns the Body? On the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Com-
mercial Purposes, I IRB at 3.
55. Moore in fact asserts a conversion claim. See Brief, supra note 1, at 19-25.
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sertion is to establish that a property right exists in the body.56 This
concept has been espoused in several broad discussions of the no-
tion of human autonomy. 57 Common law and state statutes also
lend support to the property claim by recognizing exclusive rights to
one's own name or likeness; 58 this exclusivity can be extended to
encompass one's own cells. When it is determined that a property
right in the body does exist, the proper remedy for a violation of
that right is compensation to the owner. In exploring a system of
compensation, patent law provides a helpful analogy for the argu-
ment that contributors to a product ought to retain ownership rights
in the product and continue to benefit from its commercial success.
A. Property Rights in the Body
The patient's claim against researchers who used the patient's
cells without permission is strengthened by the argument that he or
she has an exclusive property right in the body that if violated war-
rants compensation. Several ethicists have raised the possibility of
viewing the body as property over which we have exclusive owner-
ship. For example, in her discussion of human autonomy, ethicist
Judith Thomson focuses on positive and negative property rights,
i.e., owning something and preventing others from having access to
it. She relates these rights to the human body, believing that, "if we
have fairly stringent rights over our property, we have very much
more stringent rights over our own persons." 59 She goes on to say
that every person has an exclusive right to sell his or her own knee
(if anyone would buy it), damage the knee, and deny anyone else the
right to touch it or look at it.60 The exclusive dominion one has
over inanimate property becomes even more inviolable when own-
ership is immutable and the thing owned has the sanctity of the
human body.
In his article, "An Essay on Rights," Mark Tushnet also discusses
control over one's body in terms of property rights. Tushnet grap-
ples with the individual's property-based right to control an organ,
56. For a recent discussion of property rights in the body, see Comment, Toward
The Right Of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights In The Commercial Value
Of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 208 (1987).
57. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
58. For discussion of the common law, see e.g., Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L.R. 383
(1960). One example of statutory recognition of this right is Cal. Civ. Code § 3344
(West 1988).
59. Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 295, 303 (1975).
60. Id. at 303.
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such as a spleen, after its removal from his body.6' "He can donate
it to an organ bank, cook it, or throw it away. It is, after all, his
spleen." 6 2 While he concedes that we recognize such a right,
Tushnet admits that the right is "queer," as it is only understand-
able in terms of the alternatives. The ground for the right, he says,
is that it would be outrageous to allow a collection agency to com-
mandeer the spleen for some other person's use or to override the
man's decision if it is less than optimal. The property-based right in
the body is then most vivid when one imagines the consequences of
its not existing.63 The right to determine what happens to one's
body parts becomes cognizable when doctors or researchers use it
for their own benefit.
The property right in the body ought to be protected against inva-
sion.64 Common law already protects the individual's exclusive
right to appropriate his or her own name or likeness, a right that is
based on a conception of property. 65 Although cast in terms of pri-
vacy, this right is based more on a concept of ownership-what is
mine, my name, or my likeness, is mine alone and cannot be ex-
ploited by another.66 This common law right would need only a
slight extension to protect the patient from outsiders' appropriation
of cells.
This property-based notion of control over one's name or like-
ness should be extended to one's body parts. The common law rec-
ognizes the individual's exclusive right to use what is inherently
personal, and nothing is more personal than one's own genetic ma-
terial. If a person has exclusive ownership rights in his or her name
or image, it follows that he or she has the same exclusive rights in
61. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex L. Rev. 1363, 1366-67 (1984).
62. Id. Tushnet does not address whether the patient may sell his or her body part,
but the important issue is the exclusive control over the body, rather than its marketabil-
ity. It is currently illegal to sell body organs; see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying
text.
63. Id.
64. The idea ofa property right in the body can also be seen in laws governing the
disposition of dead bodies. Most courts in America recognize that a person designated
in a will or, where there is none, a family has a "quasi-property" right in a corpse. Chat-
tin, Property Rights in Dead Bodies, 71 W. Va. L. Rev. 377 (1969). While this right
arises not from a view of the body as property, but from a duty to bury the dead, id. at
380, the exclusive right to disposition is the same in this area as in the question of con-
trol of one's cells.
65. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(c) (1977) ("One who appropriates to his
own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.").
66. California has codified the privacy-property interest, making a "personality's"
interest in his or her name or likeness devisable at death. Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West
1988).
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his or her own bodv. Without the owner's consent, no outsider can
make a profit from another's property, in this case another's cells.
The monopoly granted to the individual to use his or her own
name or likeness recognizes that its use may have commercial value.
Therefore, the individual must consent to its use by another, and in
the absence of consent, any invader of that monopoly is liable for
wrongful appropriation of what is another's private property.
7
Similarly, in a case like Moore's where researchers have appropri-
ated cells to which he alone has rights, they ought to compensate
the owner. When the researchers make use of the patient's body
without the patient's consent, the researchers must compensate the
patient retroactively. It would be preferable, however, for a patient
to agree initially to grant monopoly rights to the researchers and to
receive fair compensation from the outset.
The notion of a property right in one's body accords with the
present scheme of government regulation of organ procurement
and transplantation. In 1984 Congress enacted the National Organ
Transplant Act." In addition to encouraging organ donation and
transplantation through the creation of a task force and a nation-
wide network, the Act makes it:
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." '9
The Act defines "human organ" as "the human kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin, and any
other human organ included by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services by regulation.- 7( The legislative history makes clear that
"[t]he term 'human organ' is not intended to include replenishable
tissues such as blood or sperm." 7 1 In addition to the federal regula-
tion of organ transplantation, several states have enacted their own
statutes, which are more explicit than the federal statute by exclud-
ing "hair, blood and other self-replicating body fluids" from the
67. See. e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (publica-
tion of photo was invasion of right to privacy akin to publication of private letters that
law forbade as encroachment of property interest); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976) (one who appropriates to his or
her own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his or her privacy, and the use or benefit need not necessarily be com-
mercial); Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. S. Rep. No. 382, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &




prohibition of sale. 72 The existence of these laws suggests that in
the absence of such prohibitions, the sale of organs would be legal.
The laws thus recognize, in an indirect manner, that a property right
in the body part, which includes the exclusive right to sell, vests in
its owner.
Outlawing organ sales is generally thought of as a public policy
measure that protects people from acting against their own best in-
terests in the pursuit of financial gain. The same justification, how-
ever, does not apply to regenerative body fluids. Blood, plasma,
and semen are legally sold in the United States. Because the extrac-
tion of these materials does not have permanent effects on the do-
nor, the state does not have the same interest in prohibiting their
sale to protect the donor's health.
Cells fall into the category of regenerative-and thus saleable-
body material. Unlike kidneys, livers, hearts, and other organs, cells
do regenerate; 73 they are not irreplaceable and their removal does
not have a detrimental effect on the donor's health. As cells are not
covered explicitly in any statute that prohibits organ sales, they may
be sold under the current legal system. Since cells fall into the same
category as blood, plasma, and semen, not only is it legal for Moore
to sell his leukemia cells, but also it is reasonable for him to auction
his rare cells to the highest bidder. In essence, that is Moore's
claim-that had he known his cells were worth something, he would
have struck a bargain with the doctors.
B. Patent Law as a Model for Compensation
Principles derived from property and privacy rights, as well as
moral notions, support the argument that patients must consent to
the use of their cells for research that yields a valuable product. Pat-
ent law reinforces this argument. Patent laws are designed to en-
courage innovation by ensuring that the fruits of an invention flow
to the inventor, while at the same time making new products avail-
able to the public.74 Although patent law is only roughly analogous
to the current problem in biogenetic development, the reasoning
behind the system helps to crystallize some of the issues involved
72. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1985); Cal. Pen. Code § 367f (West
1987).
73. This discussion is only directly relevant to regenerative cells. Non-regenerative
cells are more likely to be considered in the same category as organs.
74. See, e.g., Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 Res. in L. & Econ. 31,
32 (1986).
195
Yale Law & Policy Review
here. 75 The policy reasons for granting patents to inventors, en-
couraging them to make public their innovations through a system
of financial reward, may also apply to cell contributors; those whose
contributions are essential to a product's development ought to
benefit from the fruits of their contribution.
Patent law issues are not new to the biotechnology industry. More
than 6,000 patent applications are pending for biotech-related prod-
ucts. 76 The industry is developing rapidly, yet remains in the hands
of only a few firms using basically the same scientific methods, in-
creasing the likelihood of overlapping scientific efforts. 77 According
to one New York Times article, "One far-reaching issue that arises in
several cases is how to compensate a scientist whose work has been
taken a step further by another scientist."7 To what degree does
one product differ from the other? How much of a change results
from the subsequent work?
Frequently, the problem of delineating scientists' contributions
and rewarding all of the relevant participants is met by granting the
patent to joint inventors. Although the patient is not an "inventor,"
it can be argued that he or she is a type of joint player in the enter-
prise. Federal law defines joint ownership: "When an invention is
made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply for patent
jointly and each sign the application and make the required oath
...*. ,,9In Monsanto Company v. Kamp,80 the District of Columbia
district court construed this statutory definition:
A joint invention is the product of collaboration of the inventive en-
deavors of two or more persons working toward the same end and
producing an invention by their aggregate efforts .... It is not neces-
sary that the entire inventive concept should occur to each of the joint
inventors, or that the two should physically work on the project to-
gether .... The fact that each of the inventors plays a different role
and that the contribution of one may not be as great as that of another,
does not detract from the fact that the invention is joint, if each makes
some original contribution, though partial, to the final solution of the
problem. 8'
75. For an interesting discussion of notions ofjustice in the context of contributing
to a marketable product, see Murray, supra note 54.
76. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at D5, col. 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1987).
80. 269 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1967).
81. 268 F. Supp. at 824. It is only fair to note that in its definition of ajoint inventor,
the court states that, "To constitute a joint invention, it is necessary that each of the




The joint invention provision guarantees that all who contribute in a
substantial way to a product's development benefit from the reward
that the product brings.8 2 Thus, the protection of joint inventors
encourages scientists to cooperate with each other and ensures that
each contributor is rewarded fairly.
Although a patient who donates cells does not fit squarely within
the definition of ajoint inventor, the policy reasons that inform joint
inventor patents should also apply to cell donors. Neither John
Moore nor any other patient whose cells become the basis for a pat-
entable cell line qualifies as a "joint inventor" because he or she did
not further the development of the product in any intellectual or
conceptual sense. Nor does the status of patients as sole owners of
a component part make them deserving ofjoint inventorship status.
What the patients did do, knowingly or unknowingly, is collaborate
with the researchers by donating their body tissue. As stated in
Monsanto, the collaboration need not be equal to warrant joint in-
ventorship status. By providing the researchers with unique raw
materials, without which the resulting product could not exist, the
donors become necessary contributors to the product.8 3 Conced-
edly, the patent is not granted for the cell as it is found in nature,
but for the modified biogenetic product. However, the uniqueness
of the product that gives rise to its patentability stems from the uni-
queness of the original cell. A patient's claim to share in the profits
flowing from a patent would be analogous to that of an inventor
whose collaboration was essential to the success of a resulting prod-
uct. The patient was not a coequal, but was a necessary contributor
to the cell line.
thought and to the final result." Moore and other patient/donors do not contribute to
the thought or scientific effort that produces the patentable product. Even so, the lan-
guage in Monsanto is helpful in its recognition of the role of unequal contributors to an
invention.
82. The requirement of collaboration for one who claims joint inventor status is not
met where one party's invention has been incorporated in another party's invention.
Thus, in S. W. Farber Inc. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (D. Del.
1962), the court denied the claim that a patent granted for a detachable temperature
regulating connector that used a pre-existing cartridge-type thermostat was the product
ofajoint invention. The court found no evidence of collaboration between the inventor
of the connector and the inventor of the thermostat.
83. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Moore's cells themselves, while ex-
tremely rare, may not be the only cells that could have served the doctors' needs. How-
ever, every cell is unique in its genetic makeup. Even if uniqueness or rarity were not an
issue, the contribution is necessary to the success of the product, and arguments for
compensating the contributor remain the same.
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III. A Profit-Sharing Proposal
Patients have valid claims to control the disposition of their body
parts-claims based on moral intuitions, statutory analogies, and
constitutional guarantees. Voluntary or involuntary relinquishment
of that right warrants patients' claims to compensation. As biotech-
nology advances and becomes more profitable, more patients will
bring these kinds of claims against researchers. Such litigation
could slow the pace of research and development in this area.
Assuming that medical research is a good, policymakers ought to
act to prevent future lawsuits similar to Moore's. Among the possi-
ble legislative solutions is the development of a form waiving a pa-
tient's claim to resulting profits. Alternatively, Congress may decide
not to regulate at all, but rather to leave the issue to the researcher
and patient to resolve in a free market setting. A third and more
equitable solution would be to establish a system whereby research-
ers and patients routinely share in the profits from the cell-based
product. Such a licensing system would address both patient con-
sent and patient compensation.
The benefits of a licensing system can best be seen in comparison
to the weaknesses of both the informed consent/waiver of profits
and the free market solutions. Informed consent would include a
waiver of the patient's rights to future claims to any profits resulting
from work with his or her body parts.8 4 If a patient were presented
with such a waiver at the same time that he or she was consenting to
initial treatment, the coercive force would be clear; physicians would
seemingly be linking the provision of treatment to the patient's will-
ingness to give up future rights to profits. Even if a patient found
the prospect of a doctor's profiting from him or her objectionable,
he or she might feel obliged to sign the waiver in order to receive
the initial treatment. The enforceability of informed consent waiv-
ers is also uncertain. Neither the doctor nor the patient can be cer-
tain that a waiver to future profits would be upheld in court.85
Finally, under the informed consent/waiver solution the patient
gives up his or her rights to be rewarded for the donation. In light
84. For a discussion of informed consent as a response to this issue, see, e.g., Levine,
supra note 18, at 7, 8; Sun, Whose Cells are They, Anyway?, Wash. Post, July 2, 1986
(Health), at 18. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
85. According to Patricia King, a lawyer and faculty member at Georgetown Univer-
sity, waivers do not afford good protection against future lawsuits. She predicts that in
the area of cell development, "[tihe courts are going to bend over backwards to see if




of the arguments developed above, a more just solution provides for
at least some compensation to flow to the patient-donor.8 6
A free market system of buying and selling body parts is also far
from ideal. A free market that would allow doctors and patients to
strike a bargain in any given case would require separate contractual
agreements in every situation where the researcher had reason to
predict that some profit might come from research with the patient's
body parts. In order to ensure that the patient haot given his or her
consent, the deal would have to take place before the actual product
was produced. Both the doctor and patient would be burdened by
this negotiation and frequently the patient's hopes would be unreal-
istic. In reaching an agreement, the bargaining power of a treating
doctor would far outweigh that of the ailing patient, making it un-
likely that the patient would be able to realize his or her true contri-
bution.8 7 Finally, a market system would place a price on the actual
body part; a researcher could, with one payment, become the owner
of the patient's cells, with no interest retained by the patient.
A fixed rate of profit-sharing satisfactorily resolves each of these
problems.88 First, a license guarantees that the patient receive some
reward for his or her contribution. Unlike a waiver to future profits
included in the initial informed consent/waiver' the license agree-
ment may be separated from the treatment stage of the doc-
tor/patient relationship and therefore is less likely to coerce the
patient. The patient may still be required to sign an initial informed
consent waiver to give the doctor the right to use the patient's cells
in research, but only later when the research process leading to po-
tential profits begins will the patient be presented with the license
agreement."'- An appropriate time to disclose to the subject the
market value of the product is at the "stage of inevitability, the stage
in applied research at which the development of a product that
86. It is possible that a patient could waive his or her right to be compensated, but
only after being fully informed of his or her option to partake in the profits.
87. See Levine, supra note 18, for a discussion of different bargaining powers accord-
ing to the rarity of the patient's cells.
88. The typical license in the patent context is issued from a patent holder to a cor-
poration on the condition that the licensee pay a set fee and a percentage of the royalties
to the licensor. The licensor retains a property interest in the patent. Analogously, the
patient retains a property interest in the body part that he or she licenses to the scientist
on the condition that he or she receive some percentage of the profits derived from the
product.
89. It would be possible to divide the informed consent into two stages, one at the
curative and one at the research stage. However, such a practice does not solve the
original problem of providing compensation to the patient.
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could have market value becomes inevitable," as Levine suggests. t 0
Waiting until this point separates therapy and consent to conduct
research from consent to develop a saleable product, eliminating
the element of coercion. Disclosure at this point does not prema-
turely raise the patient's expectations of profiting from his or her
contribution. Finally, a license system stands on more certain legal
footing than would an informed consent waiver, as it would be de-
fined by statute rather than being judge-made.
Congress shoild determine an appropriate rate of compensation,
eliminating the need for separate determinations in each case and
the confusion of varying state compensation schemes. Government
rate setting will equalize the bargaining power between doctor and
patient, as both will enter the deal on terms set by a third party.
Finally, a profit-sharing plan relieves the perception that patients
are "selling" their body parts. The free market system sets a price
on the body part itself, whereas the license agreement focuses on
the profits made from the product.9 1 Rather than having a market
in which the researcher buys out the patient's interest in his or her
body, the license option moves toward establishing a continuous
partnership between the researcher and patient.
The license allows the researchers to use the patient's body and
derive profit from it on the condition that a percentage above a stat-
utorily determined minimum be returned to the donor. The exact
figures would be determined by Congress, 92 perhaps with the advice
of the AMA. The drafters should consider what percentage of the
profits would be high enough to encourage patients to agree to the
terms while low enough to allow researchers to make profits suffi-
cient to provide an incentive for biotechnological research. It
should also provide a large enough return that researchers are not
tempted to work around the license system by failing to seek a li-
censing agreement in the hope that the patient will remain unaware
that his or her body cells could yield a profit. Additionally, the li-
cense should require researchers to get the patient's consent if they
90. Levine, supra note 18, at 7. Levine goes on to recommend that if the patient
chooses to accept the product development, he or she would, at this point, be required
to waive any right to a share in the profits.
91. For an insightful discussion of the societal interest in not pricing body parts, see
G. Calabresi, Tragic Choices (1978).
92. One appropriate entity for examining these issues is the Biomedical Ethics
Board, which consists of members of the House and Senate. The Board appoints an
advisory committee to conduct studies and reports on "ethical issues arising from the
delivery of health care and biomedical and behavioral research, including the protection
of human subjects of such research and developments in genetic engineering . 42




wish to sell the product or patent to a third party and to assure the
patient that they will sell it at fair market value with the patient re-
ceiving a set percentage of the sale price. 93 The AMA might also
help to foster compliance by including in its ethical guidelines a re-
quirement that doctors engaging in research using patients' body
parts present the statutory licensing agreement to the patient at the
appropriate time. Failure to propose a license would be punishable
by fine and/or professional sanction, and the license itself would be
enforceable in contract.
The licensing agreement proposed here resolves many of the is-
sues raised by biogenetic research. The license ensures that the pa-
tient consent to the development of his or her cells into a saleable
product. Requiring notice and consent protects the patient's right
of privacy by protecting his or her right to determine what is done
with the cells. This self-determination is necessary if biogenetic re-
search is to comply with notions of human dignity. The license also
accords with property law principles, as it is based on the idea that
the patient remains the owner of the cell and only agrees to allow
the scientists to use it while continuing to share. in the resulting
profits. The profit-sharing arrangement fairly compensates the con-
tributor just as joint inventors are compensated in patent law.
A licensing arrangement is not perfect. Doctors still retain signifi-
cant bargaining power over patients; the requirement that a doctor
offer a license must be strictly enforced for patients to receive fair
compensation.
Conclusion
A license agreement ensures both that the patient has consented
to the use of his or her body in the development of a marketable
product and that the patient has been compensated for his or her
contribution. The above discussion shows that this kind of insur-
ance ought to be required in the bioengineering field. The patient's
consent is mandated by professional medical standards. Research-
ers must also receive a patient's consent in an effort to respect his or
her right to privacy-a right that exists as a matter of common law,
state statutes, and constitutional law. A patient's property interest
in his or her body further strengthens the claim to maintain control
over the disposition of that which is exclusively his or hers. When
93. Like other property rights, the license should be devisable. This is particularly
appropriate where, as here, the property owners are generally in poor health.
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any of these rights is violated, the patient must be justly
compensated.
A system of compensation that is structured as a "joint venture,"
rather than as a retroactive payment following a violation, is more
respectful of the patient as a participant in the development of the
product that incorporates his or her body. It is this sense of respect
that is at the heart of the patient's claim to a share of the profits.
Both the consent and compensation requirements are, at their base,
efforts to treat the patient as fully autonomous - as able to control
what is done with his or her body and to partake in any financial
benefits derived from it.
A standard profit-sharing arrangement strikes a balance between
concern for the patient's dignity and autonomy and concern for the
progress of biogenetic research. Such a balance should not be ar-
rived at through litigation, but through a coherent policy that re-
spects the values and rights of patients and recognizes the benefits
of medical progress.
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